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We employ bootstrap methods (Efron (1979)) to test the effect of an important electoral 
reform implemented in Italy from 1993 to 2001, that moved the system for electing the Par-
liament from purely proportional to plurality rule (for 75% of the seats). We do not find any 
effect on either the number of parties or the stability of governments (the two main objectives 
of the reform) that remained unchanged at their pre-reform level. 
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Among political institutions, the most widely studied is certainly the electoral rule. This reects
the crucial importance that both political scientists and economists assign to the rules governing
the ballot box in shaping the characteristics of the political system, the behaviour of voters, the
selection of politicians, the policies chosen by governments and nally, the economic outcomes.
For instance, among political scientists, Duverger (1954) analysis has spanned an enormous lit-
erature attempting to connect the features of the electoral rule with the equilibrium number of
parties and candidates (e.g. Cox (1997)). On their side, economists have developed several mod-
els explaining policy and economic outcomes as the result of the contrasting incentives generated
by the dierent electoral systems (for a survey, see Persson and Tabellini (2001)). This focus
seems also to be justied on empirical grounds. According to Persson and Tabellini (2005) ex-
tensive empirical analysis, for example, the electoral rule is indeed the "key" political institution:
ceteris paribus, a switch from proportional voting to plurality rule should generate an impressing
5% GDP decrease in public spending1. But this analysis, as many others addressing similar
relationships between the electoral system and economic outcomes (see for instance, Alesina and
Drazen (1991), Alesina and Perotti (1994); Persson et al. (2003)), is based on comparison across
countries that dier along many other dimensions beyond the electoral rule. And however clever
devices one can imagine for trying to identify a causal eect, there always remains the doubt
that the relationship between the electoral rule and the outcome of interest may be generated by
some other uncontrolled factor that "cause" both the electoral rule and the outcome2. Besides,
reforms of the electoral system are in reality rare events3, so that we generally lack the kind of
variation that could help us in identifying casual eects.
This suggests that to get more convincing evidence one should rather try to concentrate on
the few existing examples of electoral reform inside a single country, where the ceteris paribus
assumption is more reasonable. On these grounds, we discuss here the eects of an important
reform introduced in Italy in 1993 (and then repealed again in 2005). This reform changed the
electoral rule for the national parliament, moving it from a pure proportional system to a mixed
electoral one, where 75% of the seats were assigned through plurality rule in single candidate
districts and the rest by proportional voting (e.g. Soberg Shugart and Wattenberg (2001); see
below for further details). The reform, somewhat imposed on the Italian parliament by the
results of a national referendum (D'Alimonte (2001)), had, according to his advocates, several
objectives. The rst and foremost was to increase the accountability of parties and politicians,
forcing them to form pre-electoral coalitions on well dened policy platforms. But it was also
expected that the reform would solve some long term problems of the Italian party systems, such
as the excessive fragmentation of the political landscape and the short duration of governments
and legislatures. The majoritarian prize in the single district would force the dierent parties to
merge together and eliminate the smaller and more extreme parties from the political arena. The
stability of governments and legislatures would raise as the electoral cost for parties to dissolve
existing coalitions (once they were formed) would increase. Accordingly, we compare here before
and after reform values of several variables capturing these expectations, such as the number of
parties represented in Parliament, the number of parties in the ruling coalition, the duration of
governments and of legislatures and the seats of the major party in the ruling coalition.
1See also Persson and Tabellini (2004). For a contrary view, see Iversen and Soskice (2006) and Ticchi and
Vindigni (2010).
2For a criticism along these lines see for instance the Acemoglu (2005) review of Persson and Tabellini (2005).
3Indeed, in the sample of 60 democracies studied by Persson and Tabellini (2003) only two enacted important
reforms of their electoral system between 1960 and 1990 (Cyprus and France).
2Concerning the empirical analysis, our statistical inference will be based on the bootstrap.
Traditionally, statistical inference is based on the asymptotic theory. However, rst-order asymp-
totic theory often gives a poor approximation to the distributions of test statistics with the sample
sizes available in our analysis. As a result, the nominal levels of tests based on asymptotic critical
values can be very dierent from the true levels. But advances in computing have made an alter-
native approach increasingly attractive. This approach is to generate a large number of simulated
values of the test statistic and compare the statistic obtained with the original sample with the
empirical distribution function of the simulated ones. This procedure, proposed by Efron (1979),
is called bootstrap. More interesting, as shown in Hall (1992), bootstrap methods deliver more
accurate inference in nite samples than rst-order asymptotic approximations while in large
sample is at least as accurate as the approximation obtained from rst-order asymptotic theory4.
Concerning our empirical results, we do not nd any eects of the reform on the stability of
government or on the number of parties. In other words, looking at both the average duration of
Italian governments and the number of parties represented in Parliament time series we do not
nd any structural change in spite of the changed electoral rule. Concerning the other analysed
variables, the number of seats of the major party fell, whereas the number of parties inside the
ruling coalitions increased, meaning that if anything the reform had the eect of increasing the
instability of the ruling coalitions, contrary to the expectations.
In our view, these results raise considerable doubts on the trust that economists and other
social scientists have on the importance of the electoral rule for political behaviour or on their
ability to predict the eect of a reform. Electoral rules are just one component of the general
structure of the political system, which is the result of the sedimentation of long run historical
process. As such, this cannot be changed that easily.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides further information on the
1993 Italian reform. Section 3 present our data and empirical analysis. Section 4 concludes by
discussing our results more extensively.
2 The Italian reform
In 1993, Italy adopted a mixed electoral system for the election of both branches of its bicameral
legislature, abandoning the proportional electoral rule that had characterized the country for
48 years. The reform was not based on the result of an extensive discussion in the country
or in the Parliament on the shortcomings of the former electoral system (as it happened, for
instance, in New Zeland in the same year), but it was rather the result of a somewhat random
process5, involving (in order): 1) the results of a 1992 judicial investigation ("clean hands")
that had revealed the extent and depth of political corruption, undermining popular consensus
in the old political parties and creating support for radical reforms; 3) the results of a national
referendum6 on the electoral system for the upper house, that given the constraints imposed
in Italy on this legislative tool7, could only change that system in the direction of introducing
plurality rule for 75% of the seats; 4) the subsequent decision by the Parliament to uniform the
4The idea to use the bootstrap in empirical analysis related to electoral system is not new. Fredriksson and
Millimet (2004) investigate the eect of electoral rules on environmental policymaking and their inference is based
on the bootstrap.
5See Katz (2001) for a detailed account.
6Held in April 1993 and approved by 83% of voters.
7Popular referenda in Italy can only erase some existing pieces of legislation but cannot propose new one.
3system for electing the Chamber as much as possible to the new one for the Senate8, in order to
guarantee political congruence between the two houses (deemed necessary in the perfect Italian
bicameralism system). Some dierences however remained (due to constitutional constraints),
as the rules employed to elect the Chamber allowed voters to cast two separate ballots, one
for each tier, while in the election of the Senate the proportional and majoritarian votes were
fused into one9. The seats not allocated through plurality rule were assigned on the basis of the
votes received by the dierent lists at the national level, through a mechanism (called scorporo)
that was meant to protect the best losers, with again some small dierences between the two
houses10. A threshold was also imposed, so that only lists that had gained at least 4% of votes
at the national level could participate to the proportional distribution of seats.
Despite the confuse path of the reform, the introduction of the new electoral laws was accom-
panied by a lively debate, inside and outside the Parliament, to which all main Italian political
scientists participated (see Katz (2001) and D'Alimonte (2001) for a detailed review of the main
positions). And while reservations were raised by many analysts on pieces and bits of the reform,
there was also a widespread consensus on its ability to bring about its main objectives. The most
cited one was to (1) "secure the stability of parliamentary majorities and hence a greater capacity
to govern". A second was for a (2) "simplication ("aggregation") of the party system, at the
minimum by encouraging the formation of stable governing coalitions, if not simply the merger
of many parties into larger formation" (Katz (2001, p. 102))11. Related objectives were 3) to
create the possibility of alternation in government12 and 4) to increase the direct accountability
of individual members of Parliament to their electors. Objective 3) was certainly reached as the
parliamentary majority shifted from the center right to the center left and back in the three
national elections held with the new system (1994, 1996, 2001). There is also some evidence that
objective 4) was also reached, at least in competitive districts (Galasso and Nannicini (2011)).
What about objectives (1) and (2)?
3 Data set and Empirical Analysis
To answer the question, we collect data for all Italian political elections in the time span going from
1948:04:18 to 2001:05:13. Over this period, there were eleven general elections under proportional
representation, and three general elections under the mixed electoral system described above.
During the period, 55 governments were in oce: 47 before the 1993 electoral rule reform.
To test the impact of the 1993 electoral reform, we estimate ve regressions of the following
form
yt = c + Dt + t (3.1)
8Law n.276 and Law n.277, both approved in August 1993.
9See Ferrara (2006) for a detailed analysis of the consequences of this dierence for strategic entry by candidates.
10See again Katz (2001) for details. Basically, the votes used to elect the candidates in the single district by
plurality rule were subtracted by the total votes received at the national level by the lists supporting the winning
candidates and the remaining votes were used to allocate the remaining seats of both the Chamber and the Senate.
11As Mario Segni, the proponent of the 1993 referendum put it "governability cannot be assured unless there is
also a simplication and homogenization of the political stage"
12It should be recalled that in the aftermath of the second world war Italy had basically the same government
majority for all the years preceding the reform, due to the dominant role played by the Christian Democratic Party
and the exclusion to power of the Italian Comunist Party, the largest comunist party in the western world.
4where t = 1;:::N, where N is the sample size, and Dt is a 0;1 dummy variable which is equal
to 1 after the 1993 electoral reform and zero otherwise. yt represent the way we capture the
expectations (1) and (2) above13. Specically, we use a) the number of days the parliament is in
oce and b) the number days the government is in oce as alternative measures for the stability
of government or government coalitions, prediction (1) above. We use c) the number of parties
in the Parliament, d) the number of seats of the majority party, and e) the number of parties
in the coalition government as alternative measures of the fragmentation of the political system.
The error term t  i:i:d:(0;2
t) with possibly 2
t 6= 2
s for t 6= s.
To obtain consistent empirical evidence there are two issues to consider: the small sample
size, and the short period during which the dummy variable is equal to one.
One way to attack the rst issue is to use bootstrap methods. These were originally proposed
by Efron (1979) and have become the standard approach to obtain robust inference when the
sample size is small. Davidson and Mackinnon (2004) (p. 171) show very good performance of
the bootstrap using a sample size of 10 observations (see also Davidson and Flachaire (2008)
for further experimental evidence). For these reasons, the standard errors (and the p-values) for
the OLS point estimates are obtained by employing the bootstrap. To be more specic, when
the time series is homoscedastic the appropriate bootstrap is the regular bootstrap, while if the
time series displays heteroscedasticity, the appropriate bootstrap method is the so-called wild
bootstrap (see for details Davidson et al. (2007) and Davidson and Flachaire (2008)). In brief,
we pre-test for homoscedasticity, and if we reject the null hypothesis, we compute the standard
errors and the p-values by the wild bootstrap.
To attack the second issue we perform some Monte Carlo experiments (reported in the Ap-
pendix). In the experiments, we compute the power function for the same t-test used in the
empirical analysis. We re-create exactly the same conditions used in the empirical analysis: the
same sample size and the same dummy variable. As shown and explained in the Appendix, the
results conrm that indeed our inference is consistent14 .
For completeness, we report the Ljung-Box autocorrelation test, and the adjusted  R2.
The estimation results are shown in table 1 15. As shown, the  is highly statistical signicant
in only two out of ve regressions. In particular, the number of seats of the majority party
decreased by 94 seats and the number of parties in the coalition government increased by 2 after
the reform. This means that, contrary to its main objectives, the reform did not aect either
the stability of governments (legislatures) or the fragmentation of the political system. It had,
however, the eect of making the ruling coalitions more unstable, increasing the number of parties
inside it and reducing the role and the importance of the major party. This was again against
expectations.
4 Conclusion and discussion
Our results may be interpreted in dierent ways. Possibly, the Italian reform was ill designed to
reach its objectives, and possibly, Italian politicians and parties were smart enough to nd ways
13For simplicity, we only concentrate here on the Chamber. However, we repeated the exercise for the Senate
too, obtaining basically the same results (available by the authors on request).
14The Ox (Doornik (2001)) code to compute the power functions reported in the appendix is available on the
Monticini's webpage
15As a further check, the null hypothesis of equal means is rejected for all the dependent variables by the
non-parametric Wilcoxon rank sum test at the 1% level
5to circumvent the constraints introduced by the reform 16. But it is still surprising that none
of the expected and plausible eects of the reform did actually take place and what happened,
if happened, went in the opposite direction to expectations. It is also true that the reform has
been in place only briey. One could argue that the time period was indeed too short to aect
the behaviour of voters, who did not have the time to learn and understand the new rules. But
this argument is not entirely convincing. First, in a longer time span many other things also
change, making in fact more dicult to identify the eect of a reform. Second, the point is that
even in our limited time span, we could not nd any tendency for our variables to move in the
direction expected by the reform. Contrary to the main avour of the literature surveyed above,
the Italian experience then suggests caution in predicting the eects of a reform of the electoral
rule, even on the political variables that are directly inuenced by the electoral system.
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Table 1: (*), (**), and (***) denote 10%, 5%, 1% signicance level respectively, based on HC
standard errors (shown in parenthesis). N is the sample size.
Appendix
In order to investigate the properties of the t test employed in our analysis we perform some
Monte Carlo experiments. In the experiments, we create exactly the same conditions as of the
equation 3. The true Data Generation Process (DGP) is
yt = c + Dt + t (4.1)
where t = 1:::14, c is a constant Dt is a 0;1 dummy variable which is equal to 1 in the last three
observations, and zero otherwise. The error term t  N(0;2). In the experiments, we set  = 0
and 2 = 1 . For this model, we compute the power functions (see Davidson and Mackinnon
(2004, p. 170) ) in gure 1 for the t statistics based on both the bootstrap and the t distribution
at the :05 level. The results are based on 100,000 Monte Carlo replications and 9,999 bootstrap
sample. Both tests are exact, as can be seen from the fact that, in both cases, power equals :05
when  = 0. For all  6= 0, there is a clear ordering of the two curves. The highest curve is for
the t test based on the bootstrap. The bootstrap has higher power than the test based on the






















Figure 1: Power functions for t test at the .05 level based on 100,000 Monte Carlo replications
and 9,999 Bootstrap samples
9